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Abstract
The German uni¯cation process imposed a signi¯cant price-cost squeeze on eastern ¯rms.
Important technology di®erences between the East and the West generated high pressures on
the competitive position of eastern manufacturing ¯rms when product and factor markets in-
tegration took place. In order to avoid mayor employment and output costs, the government
subsidized eastern ¯rms. A similar process is expected in China after accession into the WTO.
The restrictions to foreign ¯rms to access domestic markets have to be lifted, and hence signif-
icant cost pressures on native, specially state-owned enterprises, are expected. The projected
employment shift from native to foreign ¯rms suggests that the Chinese government may decide
to slow down the transition process, as Germany did. This paper estimates the ¯scal costs of
arti¯cially targeting state employment through product price subsidies rather than allowing fac-
tor reallocation. The subsidy needed to increase East Germany's manufacturing employment
by 1% was around 0.9% of value-added prices, compared to a 1.2% subsidy if China targets
state employment or 18.7% if China targets native employment. These numbers imply that the
annual cost per worker targeted in Germany more than 13 times the cost per worker in China.
(JEL: F15, F16, H2. Key Words: Integration, Fiscal Transfers, Technology Gap, Germany,
China)
¤Sebastian Claro (sclaro@faceapuc.cl) Instituto de Economia, Universidad Cat¶ olica de Chile, Casilla 76, Correo
17, Santiago - Chile. Phone (56 2) 686 4325 Fax (56 2) 553 2377.
11 Introduction
The uni¯cation process in Germany in the 1990s provides an interesting natural experiment re-
garding the implications of integrating two di®erent economic systems. The costly transition in
the 1990s has raised doubts on whether traditional trade liberalization models can explain the
huge employment and output loses in the East. In standard models, integration to world product
markets have signi¯cant e®ects on product and factor prices but minor impact on quantities. The
competitive position of foreign ¯rms is not altered due to adjustments in returns of internationally
immobile factors of production, even if technology di®erences between native and foreign enter-
prises exist. However, if integration takes place also at the factor-market level, the factor-price
adjustment mechanism vanishes as inputs search for industries and ¯rms with greater returns and
¯rms with backward technologies are condemned to die.
In other words, if two economic systems (countries) liberalize their economies and integrate
with each other in product and factor markets, ¯rms with backward technologies cannot keep their
competitive position and disappear. This process is leaded by a price-cost squeeze due to product
price changes and factor markets pressures that generate a movement of resources from backward
to moreenhanced ¯rms. Thus, important employment and output costs are possible to rationalize
in a liberalization process that includes factor market integration and where factor reallocation is
not frictionless and there exist wide technology di®erences between the two economic systems.
In this context, the German uni¯cation process can be seen as a liberalization e®ort that gen-
erated an encounter of backward East with advanced West. The uni¯cation of product and factor
markets produced a signi¯cant price-cost squeeze that jeopardized the situation of eastern indus-
tries. Unemployment rates skyrocketed in East Germany from essentially zero in 1989 to 19.7%
in 1997. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, manufacturing employment in uni¯ed
Germany fell by 32% between 1989 and 1997, while the equivalent fall in western manufactures
was 15%. Considering the relative employment shares, this implies a fall in eastern employment
greater than 66%. Di®erences in technology levels, product quality, thefall of the communist block
and wage pressures from labor unions were the most important sources of real wage pressures in
2eastern ¯rms.1 2 To avoid dramatic costs, the newly uni¯ed government gave a high amount of
¯scal transfers to eastern workers and ¯rms, specially in the ¯rst half of the 1990s. These transfers
took di®erent forms - unemployment bene¯ts, social security, wageand product price subsidies and
capital investments. To some extent, all were aimed to smooth the transition to a market economy
and to enhance the process of technology transfers from the West to the East.
Theencountering of two di®erent economic systems where ¯rms in di®erent sectors have signif-
icant technology di®erences is also the case of China's entry into the WTO. China is characterized
by a dual economic system. On the one hand, it encourages foreign ¯rms (FIEs) to locate in
China, bring their capital and technologies and use the labor force. These ¯rms, present across
all sectors, are limited to access domestic markets and are encouraged to export their production
through legal and de-facto incentives. On the other hand, native ¯rms - state-owned (SOEs) and
collectively-owned enterprises (COEs)- dominatethe domestic market that is protected by a highly
distorted tari® structure. This system of product price distortions, together with some factor
market interventions, supports a dual economy where ¯rms with di®erent technologies coexist even
with some degree of factor market integration.3 Accession to the WTO mandates from China the
elimination of such distortions, as national treatment to FIEs is required. This implies that the
protective measures for native ¯rms, specially tari®s, have not only to be reduced but also made
e®ective for all ¯rms regardless of their origin or ownership structure. In other words, product
and factor price distortions that maintain the competitive position of native enterprises, specially
SOEs, have to be removed. As in Germany, a signi¯cant price-cost squeeze is expected for native
¯rms.
The paper presents a model of two di®erent economic systems with di®erent degrees of distor-
tions in product and factor markets.4 Their integration presume the leveling of the competition
1See Akerlof et.al., (1991), Dornbusch (1991), Guitien (1991), Dornbusch and Wolf (1994) and Fitzroy and Funke
(1998) for discussions about the role of real costs pressures on the outcome of Germany's uni¯cation.
2There exist ample evidence on technology di®erences between eastern and western manufacturing ¯rms. See for
example Akerlof et.al., (1991) and Funke and Jahn (2002).
3See Branstetter and Feenstra (1999), Feenstra (1998), Lardy (1992, 1998), Naughton (1996), Sachs and Woo
(1997) and Claro (2002) for discussions regarding the characteristics of China's economic structure and implications
of accessing the WTO.
4I refer in the paper indistinguishably to economic systems or countries. In the case of Germany, the concept of
3¯eld for all ¯rms and industries. The equalization of rules and elimination of distortions a®ects
negatively the ¯rms in the system with greater protective measures. However, the greatest impact
of product and factor market integration is due to the existence of technology di®erences. In the
long run, the equalization of factor returns imply that backward ¯rms must disappear unless they
catch up with more enhanced technologies. In the short run, the assumed speci¯city of capital
allows a smoother shift in resources in response to the price-cost squeeze.
Within this framework, the main determinants for the wage and employment responses of
integration are the size of technology di®erences between both systems, the degree of technology
transfers, the relative size of both systems and the degree of initial product and factor markets'
distortions. I analyze the e®ectiveness and costs for the government of reaching a targeted level
of employment greater than what market forces may imply. This kind of industrial policy is
studied by estimating the subsidy (measured as percentage of value-added prices) needed to reach
the targeted level. The paper does not discuss the welfare implications of such policy but rather
focuses on its ¯scal implications.
A comparison of theresults for Germany and China revealsthat thesubsidy required to generate
a 1% increase in East Germany's employment was around 0.9%, smaller than the 1.2% subsidy
needed to increase state employment in China. This di®erence is due to the greater pass-through
of subsidy to wages in China, given the greater relative size of state ¯rms in China and the greater
wage elasticity of labor demand. However, given the di®erences in labor force size, it is 13 times
more expensive to generatea one-worker increasein employment in eastern Germany than in state-
owned ¯rms in China. If China targets native (statepluscollective) ratherthat stateemployment,
the subsidy is 18.2%. In this case, the pass-through from subsidy to wages is close to oneas native
¯rms represent more than 80% of China's employment, lowering the e®ectiveness of the subsidy.
The paper continues in the following manner. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3
and 4 present the estimations for Germany and China respectively. Section 5 compares the costs
of smoothing the transition via price subsidies against the payment of unemployment bene¯ts to
those workers that become jobless in the transition.
country is relevant as the uni¯cation took place between two di®erent countries. However, two di®erent economic
systems coexist in China.
42 The model
I consider a simple multi-sector model of two small economic systems (countries) A and B that
produce the same set of tradable goods. Industries in these two systems face di®erent degrees
of protection from foreign product competition and are composed by identical ¯rms so I refer to
industries or ¯rms indistinguishably. At the same time, factor markets have di®erent degrees
of distortions. Markets are perfectly competitive, and ¯rms in each sector produce with CRS
technologies and two factors of production: labor that is mobile across sectors in each country
and capital that is sector-speci¯c in the period of interest. I assume that ¯rms in A have more
backward technologies than ¯rms in B in each sector.
In the pre-uni¯cation situation some degree of integration in product and factor markets may
exist between both countries. Germany and China represent two particularcasesof this framework.
In Germany, no integration whatsoever existed before1990. The West wasan open market economy
while the East was a centralized economy with several price distortions. Factor markets were not
integrated. In thecaseof China, although thenativeeconomy issubject to important product price
distortions, some integration in factor markets exists, as foreign and native ¯rms hire labor from
the native (and partially distorted) labor market. At the same time, some degree of competition
in capital markets exists between state and collective ¯rms (Brandt and Zhu (2000)).
Initial di®erences in factor returns are relevant for two reasons. First, they provide an idea
regarding thesizeof theadjustment in factorreturnsafterintegration. Second, with somedegreeof
factormarket intervention, di®erencesin factor returnsprovideameasureof thedistortionsrequired
to sustain a pre-uni¯cation equilibrium with some degree of integration in factor markets. In
general, di®erences in wageand rental ratesbetween systems will depend on technology di®erences,
product and factor markets' distortions and the degree of mobility of factors across systems. I
consider that the rental rate on capital is similar across sectors in the pre-integration situation in
each country.5 After uni¯cation, rental rates may di®er in the short run dueto capital speci¯city.




i where¿i measures product price distortions, like tari®s, and pB
i is the price of the
5With two sectors there exists a unique rental rate consistent with production in both industries. With more
sectors than factors the well-known indeterminacyin production arises. I assume that initially all sectors are producing
with the same rental rate, and hence unit-value isoquants in all sectors are tangent to the unit-value isocost.





Ki with ±i ¸0 where aC
ji is the amount of factor j required to produce one unit
of product i in country C = A; B and ±i is a measure of the productivity gap between ¯rms in A
and B.
There are four possible scenarios to establish initial di®erences in factor returns, depending on
whether there exists integration in labor and capital markets or not. If neither capital markets nor
labor marketsare integrated before uni¯cation, di®erences in factorreturns aregiven by technology
and product price di®erences, following thetraditional Hecksher-Ohlin model. In such a case, that
adequately represents Germany pre-1990, it is possible to get an expression for the rate of wages
in A and B of the following form: wA=wB = f(¿A
i ; ±i; pB
i ;aB
ji). A similar expression follows for
rA=rB. Ceteris paribus, wages are greater in B if ±i > 0. Price distortions will a®ect relative
factor returns depending on the sectoral bias of such interventions.
If labormarketsareintegrated wagestend to equalize. Considerthepresenceof someexogenous
distortions (regulations or migration restrictions) that impede wage equalization so that wA=wB =
1+¼0 with ¼0 <0. rA=rB follows from manipulating the zero pro¯ts conditions. In each industry
























Interestingly, in the two-by-two case, the two conditions implicit in (3) are consistent with
equalization of rental rates across sectors within economies. In other words, for any ¼0 there exists
a unique ¿1 and ¿2 such that, given rental rates equalization across sectors, the return to capital
6As discussed below, other distortions may be also in place that ¿ i accounts for. For example, arti¯cially high
demand from the communist block in the case of eastern Germany.
6is also equal across countries.7 This implies that any equilibrium with complete integration of
capital markets can be supported with a combination of product and factor market's interventions
(¼0; ¿1;¿2).
Equation (3) reveals that di®erences in rental rates depend on wage and price distortions and
technology di®erences. According to (3), @Ái=@±i < 0, implying that the higher the technology
gap between industries the greater the di®erence in rental rates. Also, for a given Ái @¿i=@±i >0
so that the greater the technology gap the higher the degree of protection required to reach a
certain gap in capital returns. In particular, if Ái = 1 (complete integration of capital markets),
¿A
i = ±i +¼0µB
Li.8 For a given level of labor market distortion ¼0, technology di®erences have to
be compensated with greater price distortions.
The situation of Germany and China represent two particular pre-integration cases of this
model. East Germany had distortions in product markets before 1990 and it was not integrated
in factor markets with West Germany. In the case of China, the native system has product mar-
ket distortions, but it shares a partially integrated labor market with the foreign-oriented sectors.
Expression (3) provides the di®erences in capital returns consistent with those distortions or, con-
versely, it reveals the vector of product and factor markets' distortions consistent with a given
degree of capital markets' integration.
I estimate the short run wage and employment changesdue to integration in product and factor
markets. For that, I consider variations in product prices, wage equalization following the removal
of distortions and (eventual) productivity changes dueto technology di®usion. As just mentioned,
labor is mobile across sectors but capital is assumed immobile in the short run, so that rental rate
di®erences may appear.
The variation in product prices has three components. One, changes in relative prices due
to tari® changes. This is specially relevant for the case of China as entry into the WTO imply
a signi¯cant change in the tari® structure. Second, possible changes in prices due to changes in
product demand. In the case of Germany, CMEA disappeared and eastern Germans shifted their




















K2. These two conditions are satis¯ed if ¼0 = (¿ 1 ¡ ±1)=µ
B












8Assuming ¼0 ¢ ±i s 0. In general, for any ¼0 the return to capital is equal across sectors and countries if
¼0 = (¿i ¡ ±i)=µ
B
Li(1 + ±i) for all i.
7consumption toward previously unavailablewestern products. In thecaseof China, thismay re°ect
a fall in demand due to di®erences in product quality. A third component of the (exogenous) price
change may related to the elimination of subsidies that may have existed before the integration.
This is also relevant for the case of China9
Integration a®ects employment and factorreturnsin responseto changesin thefollowing market
clearing conditions where C =A,B




















i after integration (4)














0 ) is the (inelastic) labor supply in the uni¯ed economy and QC
i is output
of sector i in country C. Thepercentage change in wages in A that clears the new aggregate labor





















µKi for i 2 A; Bi = ¸Li
¾i
µKi for i 2 B; ¸C
Li is the shareof employment in industry
i in country C in total employment, ¾i is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital
in sector i, µC
ji is the share of factor j in value-added in industry i in country C, and (1 +¼0) and
(1 +¼1) are the pre and post uni¯cation ratio of wages in country A to country B.10 c pC
i and c tC
i
are the percentage change in prices and multifactor productivity in industry i in country C11 and
9Section 4 presents a wider discussion of this issue.




A 2 [0; 1] is the percentage of the maximum productivity growth available for ¯rms in A
as a result of technology di®usion from ¯rms in B.
8sA is a price subsidy (policy instrument common across all sectors) to ¯rms in A as percentage of
value-added price. Likewise, c wB =(1+ c wA)(1 +¼0)=(1 +¼1) ¡1.
According to (7), a fall in product prices in A generates a rise in real wages, while productivity
gains havea positivee®ect on real wages. Moreover, theequalization of wagesnecessarily pressures
up wages in A if ¼0 <¼1. Although sA does not distort relative prices across sectors originally in
A, it does distort relative prices within sectors across ¯rms originally in A and B, causing a fall in
real wages for ¯rms in A. Finally, increases in prices or productivity in B ¯rms produce a rise in
wages.
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0 . Thenegativee®ect on A'semployment of theprice-cost squeezeassociated
with the integration is evident from (8), as the fall in price distortions and wage equalization
generate a rise in real wages for ¯rms in A. These e®ects can be compensated with increases in
productivity due to technology di®usion or price subsidies. Ceteris paribus, productivity gains
pressure up wages and unambiguously increase employment in A. Of course, the distribution of
technology transfers across sectors determine the relative winners in A. The price subsidy sA
required to reach an employment target of LA































iAi +(1 +¼0)=(1 +¼1) ¢
P
iBi. The subsidy depends positively on level of LA
¤
and negatively on product price and technology changes, revealing that the "distance" between
employment in A with zero subsidy and LA
¤ is shorter the greater price increases or technology
di®usion are. However, given a target level, the marginal and average subsidy are constant. Also,
@sA=@¼1 > 0; implying that the smaller the ¯nal distortions in labor markets the greater the
wage pressure on ¯rms in A and hence the greater the subsidy needed to compensate it. Finally,
@sA=@
P
iAi < 0. This e®ect includes two competing forces. On the one hand, greater
P
iAi
imply a greater response of the labor demand curve to the subsidy. On the other hand, the wage
elasticity of thelabor demand curvein A is greater, meaning that thewagepressures of the subsidy
have greater negative impact on employment in A. Overall, the latter e®ect dominates.
9Figure1a depicts the labor market adjustment where LA
d and LB
d represent thepost-uni¯cation
labor demand curves in A and B. The wage ratethat clears the new aggregate labor market is wA
1
in A, and so theemployment level is LA
1 .12 The subsidy required to reach thetarget level LA
¤ is s1,
implying a fall in employment in B from LB
1 to LB
2 . The subsidy works through two mechanisms;
it shifts the labor demand curve in A to LA
d
0 but it also rises wages. The net e®ect is a rise in
employment.
It is possible that the market clearing wage change detailed in (7) requires a negative employ-
ment level in country A.13 This is dueto the correction of initial wagedi®erences between the two
systems. This is of course not a possible outcome, as employment in A has to be non-negative.
In such scenario, I estimate the wage level in A (wA
2 ) that supports a zero manufacturing employ-
ment level in A (LA
2 = LA
d (wA
2 ) = 0). wA
2 < wA
1 is the (never observed) shadow wage level in A.
Likewise, there exist a wage level in B (wB




2 ) = LA
0 +LB
0 ), and it is greater than wB
1 in ¯gure 1a. Therefore, the relevant wage
change in A is the minimum between wA
1 and wA
2 . This case is depicted in ¯gure 1b. At wA
1 the
employment level in A is negative. LB
2 corresponds to the total labor force in the uni¯ed economy
and the distance LB
1 LB
2 is equal to LA
2 LA
1 . The shadow wage rate in A : wA
2 is such that given
the labor demand function manufacturing employment is zero. The wage rate in B : wB
2 is the
one that makes ¯rms in B employ all the aggregate labor force and it is greater than wA
2 =(1+¼1).
The e®ective wage and employment variations (compared to the pre-liberalization equilibrium)





































i + b tA
i +sA ¡ d wA
ef) (11)
The employment change in country A is bounded between [¡1; LB
0 =LA
0 ]. The subsidy required
to reach a target level has now two components. Part of the subsidy generates increases in the
12Assuming a positive ¯nal wage gap between A and B.




1 = (1 +¼1)w
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1 ) < 0.
10shadow wage in A with no e®ect in the employment level. This is because the shift in labor
demand is not big enough to support a positive employment level in A given thewage equalization
pressures with ¯rms originally from B that have more enhanced technologies. In terms of ¯gure
1b, s1 shifts A0s labor demand with no employment adjustment, as all the subsidy is absorbed in
higher shadow wages. It is not until the wage rate is A equals wA
3 = wB
2 (1+¼1) and employment
is zero that increases in the subsidy shift labor out of B.14 Additional subsidies (s2) generate rises
in real wages for ¯rms originally in B and employment in A increases. This second mechanism is
similar to the one presented in ¯gure 1a. The total subsidy needed to reach LA
¤ is s1 +s2. It can
beexpressed as percentage of value-added prices where c LA
1 isthe percentage change in employment
in A with no subsidies.
sA =
8
> > > > <
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The total subsidy depend on two elements. First, it depends on the employment target and
the e®ectiveness of the subsidy in generating a fall in real wages for ¯rms originally in A. These
e®ects are discussed in equation (9). Second, it depends on the di®erence between the wage level
consistent with no employment in A and the wage level consistent with full employment in B (wB
2
and wA




Before 1990, West Germany had an economy integrated with world markets. However, East
Germany had a relatively closed economy, highly controlled, centralized and subject to important
distortions. On the external front, it belonged to a common market composed of communists
countries named Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), that kept an arti¯cially high
demand for products with much lower valuation in world markets.
The uni¯cation of both economies in 1990 had signi¯cant e®ects on the eastern economy. On





2 the wage di®erences are greater than 1+¼1, so convergence to the ¯nal gap pressures employment
in A to the negative side again.
11increasesin factorcoststhat eastern ¯rms werenot ableto absorb dueto high technology di®erences
with the West. On the other hand, a whole new set of goods available to eastern Germans shift
product demand toward western products. At thesame time, demand from countries in theCMEA
fell dramatically due to the fall of most communist regimes in that period. As a consequence, a
price-cost squeeze for eastern ¯rms was evident, and a recession dominated the transition in the
1990s. With this scenario the new uni¯ed government implemented several policies to avoid a
dramaticfall in employment and output in the East and to provide a smooth transition toward the
new competitiveproduction structure. Thissection triesto replicate the employment consequences
of uni¯cation and the ¯scal transfers made by the government.
According to the model presented in last section, we need data on initial wage di®erences, wage
convergence, measures of technology di®erences between eastern and western ¯rms, product price
changes associated with the uni¯cation, and data on the production and employment structure
of East and West Germany at the moment of the uni¯cation. Initial wage di®erences at the
3 digit ISIC industry level are obtained from UNIDO Database, that has data on employment
and total wages and salaries for 28 manufacturing industries in eastern and western industries for
1989. Accordingly, eastern annual wages were about 37% of western wages before uni¯cation.
A similar number is reported by Sinn (2000), while Akerlof, Rose, Yellen and Hessenius (1991)
(ARYH hereafter) and Fitzroy and Funke (1998) report ratios of 35% and 30% respectively. The
initial wage gap in each industry based on UNIDO data is detailed in the second column of table
1. According to Sinn (2000), the ratio of east to west wages rose to 72% in 1996 to stabilize at
that level. Fitzroy and Funke (1998) argue that thewage-push in Germany brought eastern wages
from 30% in 1991 to 60% in 1993 of western levels. There are several explanations for the lack
of full convergence in wages, like di®erences in skills, non monetary bene¯ts, frictions to migration
or union interventions. I take the position that the persistent wage gap is related to exogenous
labor market interventions. Sinn (2000) presents a wider discussion on the reasons for the halt in
convergence in per capita output, wages and productivity in 1996.
Productivity di®erences are estimated from ARYH, who present for 9 aggregated industries
estimates for eastern ¯rms of the short-run average variable cost of earning one Deutsche mark
in trade with non-CMEA countries in 1990 (after uni¯cation).15 In other words, the variable
15The industries are: Chemicals; Metallurgy; Machinery; Transportation Equipment; Electronics; Textiles; Furni-
12cost of selling in international markets one Deutsche mark, after correcting for price and factor
costs changes associated with the uni¯cation process. A value greater than 1 reveals that the
¯rm is not viable in the sense that the unitary variable costs of producing are greater than the
price. In terms of the model just presented, we can proxy short-run average variable costs for the
unitary employment costs after considering the capital stock in the short run as immobile. The




Li1 where the subscript 1 indicates
after-uni¯cation values and the superscript e refers to eastern ¯rms. It is an estimation of the
labor share in value-added in each eastern industry with new product and factor prices. Because
these measures are for the end of 1990 and the uni¯cation started in mid 1990, they implicitly
consider pre-liberalization technology levels. This is a desirable feature for we want to capture the
technology gap at the moment of integration. Like the interpretation of ARYH, if µe
Li1 > 1 the
return on capital is smaller than zero, and the ¯rm is not viable in the absence of ¯xed costs.
The(hicks-neutral) technology gap between eastern and western ¯rmsisimplicit in thede¯nition
of µe





















Li0(1 +¼0)(1+ c we)
¡1 (12)
where ¼0 is the initial wage ratio, c we is the (endogenous) wage change in the east, c pe
i0 is the
percentage change in output prices that equates the price of similar goods in the East and the
West and ±i is a measure of technology di®erences between eastern and western ¯rms such that
ae
fi = (1+±i)aw
fi. We can computethe variables in the right hand side of (12) for each 3-digit ISIC
industry. Data on µe
Li1 isobtained from ARYH using the mapping described in column 1 of table1.
The share of labor in total value-added in western industries at themoment of uni¯cation -µw
Li0 - is
calculated foreach 3-digit ISIC industry in 1989 from UNIDODatabase, and it isdetailed in column
3 of table 1. The wage change considered is the 42% increase in the period ¯rst quarter/October
1990 in each eastern industry reported by ARYH while the initial wage gap is computed from the








13UNIDO database as described above. Columns 4 to 6 detail the variable cost ratio, the implicit
parameter ±i obtained from computing equation (12) and the corresponding maximum total-factor
productivity gain available for eastern ¯rms (±i=1 +±i). On average, eastern ¯rms were able to
obtain productivity gains up to 85% by adopting western technologies.
I follow two alternative strategies to estimate the e®ects of uni¯cation on wages and employ-
ment reallocation. First, I estimate the wage change consistent with full employment in the new
aggregated labor market, and estimate the corresponding employment reallocation from theEast to
the West for di®erent technology transfers assumptions. Additionally, I computethe price subsidy
that delivers an employment change in eastern manufacturing sectors that matches the observed
employment change. An alternative strategy is to estimate the employment reallocation suggested
by the evolution of e®ective wages (that may di®er from the market-clearing one), and compare
the ¯scal transfers required to match observed employment changes with the observed ones. I
focus on the period 1990-96 because it provides a long enough sample to discuss the implications
of employment reallocation and it is short enough to make the assumption of sector-speci¯c capital
reasonable. Besides, 1996 marks the halt of convergence according to several measures discussed
in Sinn (2000). Therefore, the evidence post 1996 may be a®ected by other events not included in
the model. The results are robust to alternative periods.
3.1 Market-clearing wage changes
The wage change that clears the new aggregate labor market is computed using equation (7). I
considera1996 wageratioof 72% reported by Sinn (2000). Wagechangesareestimated fordi®erent
degrees of technology di®usion and product price adjustment for eastern products. These are the
two determinants of equation (7) over which we have less information. Table 2 reports the values
of the coe±cients of the model used to compute the parameters. The elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital is estimated in Claro (2002). (See appendix 1). The wage adjustment
in East Germany (c we) with no subsidies is given by the following expression
c we =min
£
0:591+0:375¢ b pe +0:302 ¢ Á;0:903 + b pe +0:81¢ Á
¤
(13)
where b pe is the percentage change in value-added prices (common across all sectors in eastern
Germany) and Á 2 [0; 1] is the percentage of the initial technology gap between eastern and west-
ern ¯rms that is closed. The assumption of a common Á implies that multifactor productivity
14gains di®er across sectors. Implicit in (13) is the combination of price and productivity changes
that sustain manufacturing sectors in eastern Germany with market-clearing wage changes and no
subsidies, given by Á> ¡0:61¡1:23b pe. Thus, with no technology di®usion eastern manufacturing
employment is not sustainable for price falls beyond -50%. Likewise, employment in the East is
positive even with no subsidies if Á >0:63, regardless of the change in product prices.
As discussed in section 2, the subsidy se required to reach an employment target of Le
¤ will also
depend on the relative size of ¼1 and ¼0, b pe, and Á. Accordingly,
se =
8
> > > <


















¡0:4b pe ¡0:324Á+1:25 otherwise
9
> > > =
> > > ;
As expected, the condition for the subsidy to be smaller in the case that Le
1 ¸ ¡1 is indeed
Á > ¡0:61 ¡ 1:23b pe, that is the same condition to sustain a positive manufacturing employment
level in the East without subsidies.
Thereexists some evidence with respect to the degree of technology di®usion between 1990 and
1996 from western to eastern ¯rms. According totheDeutscheBundesbank Monthly Report of July
1996, average east/west output per worker (1=1 +±) was 0.53 in 1994. Considering the evolution
of employment and output per worker in West and uni¯es Germany using BLS data, I estimate a
similar ratio of 0.15 in 1990. Moreover, with information from the Bundesbank Monthly Report
in 1998 we can estimate the same ratio for 1996 in 0.59. This implies an average productivity
growth between 1990 and 1996 of 75% approximately.17 In terms of our notation, Á =0:89. With
this degree of technology di®usion, eastern manufacturing employment was sustainable for almost
any demand shift. This is a ¯rst important conclusion. Also, between 1990 and 1996 eastern
manufacturing employment fell approximately by 66%, from more than 2.5 million workers to less
the 900 thousands, implying a value for Le
¤=Le
0 =1=3.
The change in prices consistent with a fall in eastern employment of 66% in the absence of
any subsidy is a 71% fall computed using equation (11). However, we know that several transfers
to eastern ¯rms took place. Several sources report annual transfers to eastern Germany around
90-billion dollars (representing around 40% of East Germany manufacturing GDP between 1990
17The initial East/West ratio in output per worker of 0.15 implies a ± of 5,6. This implies a maximun productivity
gain of 85%. This is close to the values reported in table 2 from Akerlof et.al., (1991).
15and 1996).18 According to Bach and Vester (2000), transfersvaried from US$ 39 billions to US$ 80
billions each year between 1991 and 1996 (between US$ 27 billions and US$ 63 billions excluding
unemployment bene¯ts). TheBureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department on Commerce
in several issues of the "German Report on EconomicPracticeand Trade" estimates total transfers
fromwestern to eastern Germany wereabout DM152 billionsannually (US$ 92 billions). According
to Sinn (2000), public transfers represented 4.5% of West German GDP, and this number rises to
5.6% if east German public borrowing is accounted for. Thesenumbersrepresent roughly transfers
between 90 and 115 billion of dollars annually. Considering a share of manufacturing sector in
Eastern Germany around 50% of tradable industries, this implies a subsidy of 24% of value-added
prices. With this subsidy, the changes in prices consistent with a fall in employment of 66% is a
95% fall. This implies a wage increase of 59%, much smaller than the 95% reported by Sinn.
Alternatively, the change in prices consistent with a 95% increase in wages and a 24% subsidy
is a 1,6% rise. This number is clearly inconsistent with the evidence. Moreover, these numbers
imply a null change in eastern employment, inconsistent with the observed 66% fall. Therefore,an
analysis of the employment and ¯scal implications of the German uni¯cation based on market-
clearing wage adjustment does not adequately replicate the evidence. Several authors suggest
that the wage response in East Germany re°ected important pressures to equalize wages with
western workers.19 I thereby consider observed wage changes in the ¯rst half of the 1990s as
exogenous and estimate the employment and ¯scal transfers' implications of such variations in
workers' compensations.
3.2 Observed wage changes
Theresponseof eastern employment is given by the following relationship computed using equation
(11): c Le = ¡1:107c we +0:893Á+1:107b pe +1:107se. The impact of a rise of 1 percentage-point
in real wages is a fall of 1.1 percentage-points in employment. Similar employment response is
18In 1991 manufacturing value-added in eastern Germany was approximately US$ 258 billions, falling to almost
US$ 164 billions in 1996. The ¯gure of US$ 1,276 billions is the sum of eastern manufacturing value-added from
1991 to 1996, implying an annual average manufacturing value-added in the East around 212 billion dollars. These
estimations are based on the evolution of manufacturing employment and output per worker in the East provided by
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
19See Akerlof et.al., (1991) and Sinn (2000).
16expected for price subsidies, while the response to productivity gains is smaller because a 1 point
increase in Á implies a productivity gain smaller than 1%. The subsidy required to reach Le
¤ is






























1 is the employment level in the east after uni¯cation with no subsidies. In (14) the
subsidy has a compete pass-through to employment due to its null impact on wages. Compared to
the case of endogenous wage adjustments, the size of the subsidy di®ers for two reasons. As just
mentioned there is no pass through from subsidy to wages, so the e®ectiveness of the subsidy is
greater. However, for any vector of exogenous shocks, wage increases above market-clearing ones
imply a greater di®erence between Le
¤ and Le
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Consider values of Le
¤=Le
0 = 1=3, Á = 0:87 and c we = 0:95. A subsidy of 24% is obtained with
price fall around 59%. This number is similar to the 51% reported by ARYH for 1990. The
subsidy needed to generate a 1-point increase in employment is 0.9%. This implies that the
average cost per worker of reaching an employment target of Le
¤ = Le
0=3 is USD 76,600 in the
case of exogenous wage determination, with a rise in eastern employment of more than 1 million
workers (Le
¤ ¡Le
1). This is also the marginal cost of increasing eastern employment in one worker
considering an average manufacturing value-added in the East of 212 billions of dollars and an
employment level of approximately 2.5 millions. This implies that the di®erence between Le
¤ and
Le
1 is more than 1 million workers. The cost of increasing eastern employment by one worker is
estimated in USD 122,500 if wages are endogenously determined. The greater cost is explained
by the positive pass-through from subsidy to wages, estimated in 37.5%. Alternatively, a 1.45%
subsidy is needed to increase eastern employment by 1%.
4 China's entry into the WTO
In the case of China, the dual economic system is characterized by the interaction of two types
of ¯rms. Foreign ¯rms are encouraged to bring their technologies and capital, produce in China
17and export their production. Some degree of integration in labor markets exists, generating cost
pressures on native¯rmswith backward technologies. In orderto keep them competitive, two types
of distortions are in place. First, native ¯rms sell mainly in domestic markets that are subject to
tari® protection, while foreign ¯rms are signi¯cantly limited to sell in those markets. According
to Branstteter and Feenstra (1999), the limited access to domestic markets by foreign ¯rms is
explicit as well as de facto, introducing a price gap that eventually compensates for technology
di®erences. Second, somedegree of labor markets distortions exist a®ecting both the requirements
to hire employment by foreign ¯rms and the mobility of labor across regions. These imply a
wage premium paid by foreign ¯rms between 18% and 47%.20 Within the native economy, State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) are subject to intensive competition from Collectively-owned enterprises
(COEs) which havebetter technologies and are more °exible to take production decisions. In such
context, the subsistence of the former may be due to extensive subsidies ¯nanced by the central
government.21
Entry into the WTO implies integration of both systems, eliminating product price and factor
market distortions. Real cost pressures to state ¯rms similar to those in Germany are expected
to arise. Speci¯cally, China's accession to WTO implies a change in the tari® structure vis-a-vis
the rest of the world, as well as an end to the dual economic structure. In other words, free access
of FIEs to domestic factor and product markets, including protected product markets with new
tari®s, and the elimination of distortions in the native economy.
Claro (2002) presents an analysis of the economic structure of China and estimates technology
di®erences between native (state - SOEs and collective - COEs) ¯rms and foreign ¯rms in each
industry at the 3-digit ISIC level. Appendix 2 summarizes the methodology.
Table 3 taken from Claro (2002) reports measures of technology di®erences between state and
foreign ¯rms and between collective and foreign ¯rms for 3-digit ISIC manufacturing industries
using data from 1997 and 1999 China¶s Statistical Yearbook, where TFP refers to the multifactor
productivity gains attainable with full convergence.22 Two messages follow from it. First, COEs
20Strictly speaking, it is not possible to determine whether wage di®erences re°ect di®erences in skills or produc-
tivity, foreign ¯rms' policies or distortions in factor markets.
21See Brandt and Zhu (2000) for a discussion of the way the Bank of China bene¯ts SOEs over COEs through
credit allocation.
22Appendix 2 summarizes the methodology, also taken from Claro (2002).
18have more enhanced technologies than SOEs, consistent with the observed crowding out of the
former by the latter in domestic markets. According to Brandt and Zhu (2000), subsistence of
SOEs is supported by subsidized credit from the Bank of China. Second, technology di®erences
with foreign ¯rms (either in collective and state enterprises) are greater in industries with higher
tari® protection.23 This is the way the government protects less developed native ¯rms from
foreign competition as equation (3) suggests. By limiting access of foreign ¯rms to protected
product markets, it allows native ¯rms to compete in factor markets with backward technologies.
Technology di®erences are high enough so that the leveling of the competition ¯eld puts sig-
ni¯cant pressures on the competitive position of native ¯rms, specially SOEs. Given technology
di®erences and price changes, I estimate the wage and employment implications of the integration
process, as well as the transfers required to reach state or native employment targets. I consider
a wider version of the model presented in section 2 with three types of ¯rms in each sector: state,
collectiveand foreign. (See Appendix 3). UnliketheGerman case whereweare making an ex-post
analysisof thedata, in China we areestimating the ex-antepotential impact of entry into WTOon
wages and employment. Thus, we do not have data on technology changes, price changes (other
than those due to tari® changes24), and ¯nal wage ratios. We estimate the e®ects on native ¯rms
as functions of these variables, and compare them with the implications for Germany. Table 4
details the data used to compute the parameters of the model.
Considering an initial wage ratio of state to foreign ¯rms of 0.68 and a ratio of collective to
foreign wages of 0.85 and assuming full convergence of wages we can represent the change in wages
relevant to SOEs with the following expression:
c wS =0:491c pS +0:535c pC +0:281ÁS +0:056ÁC +0:491sS +0:534sC +0:0373
where c pS and c pC represent the percentage change in product prices forstateand collective ¯rms
that exclude the e®ects of tari® changes.25 These ones are included in the last term, that also
23The correlation coe±cients between the series TFP 2 in table 3 and the initial level of tari® (¿ 0 in table 4) are
positive and signi¯cant at 5% when excluding Tobacco and Beverages industries.
24Obtained from the US-China Business Council. Unclassi¯ed Copy of US-China Bilateral Market Access Agree-
ment as Released by USTR on March 14, 2000. This agreement establishes a tari® reduction schedule until 2008.
25This equation assumes the possibility of technology convergence to foreign ¯rms' levels. However, as table 4
suggests, this may imply a productivity fall in some collective ¯rms. I also perform the estimation assuming potential
convergence to the best technology available. In such case, the maximum technology improvements are 62.3% rather
19incorporate the impact of wage equalization. The e®ect on state employment with no subsidies is
given by
c LS =¡0:241+0:845c pS ¡0:887c pC +0:483ÁS ¡0:093ÁC
Thepositivee®ect of c pS and ÁS on stateemployment reveal that theshift in labordemand dueto
price increases or technology improvements dominates their indirect impact on wages. For similar
degreesof technology di®usion in stateand collective¯rms(ÁS =ÁC = Á) and consideringonly price
changes in SOEs, c LS is given by c LS =¡0:241+0:845c pS +0:39Á, implying that with no technology
di®usion state employment is viable unless price falls are greater than 90%: Alternatively, for
Á =0:87 and c pS =¡0:59 as in Germany, the change in state employment is -40%. If convergence
takes place to maximum productivity available, the fall in state employment is 55%, as the greater
productivity gains are dominated by further wage increases.
Thefall in stateemployment can be either absorbed by collective or foreign ¯rms. The change
in collective and foreign employment are given by
c LC = 0:076¡0:4296c pS +0:62c pC ¡0:2457ÁS +0:0641ÁC ¡0:4296sS +0:62sC and
c Lf = 0:3548¡0:4063c pS ¡0:4422c pC ¡0:2324ÁS ¡0:0463ÁC ¡0:4063sS ¡0:4422sC
With no subsidies, ÁS =ÁC =0:87, no price changes for collective ¯rms and fall in value-added
prices for state ¯rms of 59% the rise in collective employment is 17,1% and the rise in foreign
employment is 46,6%. Foreign ¯rms are mostly bene¯ted due to the fall in wages. Without
technology di®usion, the change in state, collective and foreign employment is given by -71%, 31%
and 57,8% respectively, revealing that overall technology convergence bene¯ts mostly state ¯rms
and hurt COEs and FIEs because wage pressures dominate productivity gains.
In the case of Germany where market-clearing wage adjustments took place, the change in
eastern employment is given by c Le = ¡0:66+0:69b pe +0:56Á assuming no subsidies. In a scenario
where Á = 0:87 and b pe = ¡0:59 the fall in eastern employment is 69%. The impact of technol-
ogy convergence is greater in Germany than China because technology di®erences are greater in
the former. However, one percentage-point increase in multifactor productivity in state ¯rms in
China generates an increase in state employment of 0,87% (= 0:483 ¢ 0:01=0:555) while a similar
productivity growth implies a increase in East Germany's employment of 0,64% (0:56¢ 0:01=0:87).
than 55.5% in state ¯rms and 23.6% rather than 11.5% for collective ¯rms on average, and the coe±cients on Á
S and
Á
C are 0:317 and 0:124 respectively.
20The di®erent e®ect of price changes re°ects two forces. On the one hand, the shift of the
labor demand curve due to a price change is greater in China, because the state sector is more
biased toward the production of labor-intensive goods than in East Germany. Moreover, state
¯rms in China are more labor intensive than East German ¯rms within each sector. These two
e®ects are compensated by the greater impact of wages on employment due to the same reason:
the real wageelasticity of labor demand in greater in state ¯rms in China than in eastern Germany.
Moreover, thepass-through from prices to wages in greater in China becauseof the greaterrelative
size of state ¯rms in China in aggregate employment. Overall, price shocks have greater impact
on China's state employment.
Additionally, initial wage di®erences were much greater in Germany than what they actually
are in China, so pure integration in factor markets generates a much greater cost pressure on
German ¯rms. This last e®ect is re°ected in the constant term in the last two expressions for
c LS and c Le. Furthermore, this di®erence is minimized by the fact that the coe±cient for China
already incorporatesthee®ect of tari®changesthat hurt state¯rmsand thecoe±cient forGermany
assumes a ¯nal wage ratio smaller than 1. Thepure wage equalization pressure is more than three
times greater in Germany.
The cost of keeping one worker employed in state ¯rms in China is $ 5,560 dollars. This is
signi¯cantly smaller than in Germany, regardless of whether we consider or not a positive pass-
through from subsidies to wages. The explanation for such dramatic di®erences is related to labor
force sizes. The subsidy needed to generate a 1% increase in China's state employment is 1.2%,
while the subsidy required to increase eastern employment by 1% is0.9% with no pass-through and
1.45% with pass-through. As just discussed, the price subsidy generates a greater net impact on
employment (net e®ect of shift in labor demand and wage increase) in China than in Germany. But
a 1% increase in state employment in China represents more than 325,000 workers, more than 13
times the equivalent number in Germany. This di®erence explains why it is much more expensive
to increase East Germany's manufacturing employment by one worker than in China while the
cost of rising target employment by 1% is more similar across countries. Also, manufacturing
value-added (the base of the subsidy) is smaller in China (154 vs 212 billion dollars), and so the
cost is smaller.
Di®erent are the results if China targets native (state plus collective) employment rather than
21state employment. In this case, the response of native employment is given by
c Ln = ¡0:043+0:049c pS +0:054c pC +0:028ÁS +0:005ÁC +0:049sS +0:054sC
Several issues arise. First, it is cheaper to reach native employment targets by subsidizing
collective ¯rms alone rather than both state and collective. Manufacturing value-added of SOEs
and COEs are similar (US$ 153.4 and US 154.5 billions of dollars), therefore the cost of increasing
native employment by one worker is US 36,000 dollars if only state ¯rms are subsidies while the
equivalent cost if only collective ¯rms are subsidized is US$ 32,880. This di®erence is due to
dissimilar wage elasticities of labor demands and pass-through from subsidies to wages.
A second element to notice is that any of these cost are signi¯cantly higher than those of
reaching state employment targets but still much smallerthan theequivalent cost in Germany. The
di®erence in costs ismainly dueto thesizeof native employment in China. By representing almost
90% of all employment, very high subsidies have to be in place to generate substantial changes in
relative prices that shift employment toward foreign ¯rms. In this case, the pass-through from
subsidies to wages is very high, and so the net e®ect on employment low. A 1% increase in native
employment requires a 18.5% subsidy, much higher than the 1.5% value for Germany. However,
the cost of increasing target employment by 1 worker isdominated by the relative sizes of the labor
force.
The results reported for China consider that the fall in prices relevant for state ¯rms have two
components. First, the fall in prices due to the new tari® structure. Second, a fall in prices
due to potential shifts in the demand for native products. There exists however a third source
of price changes for state ¯rms related to the eventual elimination of subsidies originally in place
for state ¯rms. It is argued that given the product price, factor price and technology di®erences
between state and collective ¯rms, thesubsistence of the former can be only sustained by subsidies
or targeted credit. According to measures on the World Bank, subsidies to state employment
in manufacturing sector represent around 2,6% of GDP. This value is equivalent to an average
price subsidy of 29% of value-added prices. These subsidies imply that the technology di®erences
reported in table4 areunderestimated, asthey assume asimilarreturn on capital between stateand
collective enterprises with no subsidies. In other words, the potential TFP gains from convergence
may be as high as 29 points greater than those reported in table 3 under TFP 2 for state-owned
¯rms (column TFP 3). At the same time, the liberalization imply a fall, additional to the two
22described above, of 29% in value-added prices.
This additional e®ect suggests a much greater fall in state employment than the ones just
discussed. But this e®ect is decreasing as the technology gap between state and foreign ¯rms
close. Indeed, if full convergence takes place (ÁS =1), the negative e®ect from a lower subsidy is
exactly compensated by a greater increase in multifactor productivity. Furthermore, regardless of
the zero-subsidy changein state and nativeemployment, the subsidy required to generate marginal
increases in employment is not a®ected by the new vector of productivity and price changes. This
is because shifts in labor demand and wage pressures are independent of the fall in product prices
and productivity gains in state ¯rms. However, the total cost of reaching a target state or native
employment level is greater as the di®erence between a given target and the post-liberalization
zero-subsidy equilibrium is greater.
5 Subsidies versus Unemployment Bene¯ts
Are these costs worthy? If employment reallocation is costless, it is clear that subsidizing state
or native employment in China or eastern employment in Germany is not optimal and has only
a redistributive e®ect. But if the reallocation of workers is costly and unemployment arises, it
might beoptimal (at least from the workers point of view) to give subsidies to the shrinking sectors
to avoid drastic unemployment increases. The experience of eastern Germany suggests that the
employment costs of reallocation may be quite high. Without getting into the intertemporal
discussion of whether the subsidies just postponethe unemployment costs or e®ectively reduce the
intertemporal costs of adjustment, I present a simple comparison for Germany and China of the
costs of keeping employment high via subsidies against paying bene¯ts to unemployed workers.
Consider that a proportion ¸ 2 [0; 1] of workers released from shrinking ¯rms fall in the unem-
ployment pool. Thereare two possible strategies to 'protect' workers. The¯rst one is to subsidize
production in the shrinking sectors, with a cost of c dollars per worker targeted. This implies a
cost per unemployed worker of c=¸. An alternative option is to give unemployment bene¯ts to
those workers by b ¢ w, where w is the average or reference wage the worker was receiving before
being unemployed and b 2 [0;1] is thepercentage of the annual wage that is paid as unemployment
bene¯t. Given an average manufacturing wage of US$ 8,800 in eastern Germany and US$ 820
in state ¯rms in China, the policy of subsidizing ¯rms is more costly than paying unemployment
23bene¯ts. Indeed, the number of reference wages required to make the subsidy policy a cheaper
one for ¸ = 1 is 8,7 for Germany and 6,8 in China. These numbers are de¯nitely way above the
bene¯ts paid in other countries with unemployment insurance policies, that roughly move between
30% for Italy to 90% for Denmark according to the 1999 edition of "Bene¯ts System and Work
Incentives" from OECD.
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26APPENDIX 1: ESTIMATION OF THE ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION
Consider a simple CES production function of the form q = (aK½ +bL½)1=½. When combining
the ¯rst order conditions with respect to capital and labor, we get lnw=r = lnb=a+(½¡1)ln L=K.
Theestimation of thisequation using 28 3-digit ISIC manufacturing cross-country data for1996
from UNIDO provides an estimator of the elasticity of substitution ¾ = 1=(1 ¡½). The database
provides information on sectorial employment for each country, and sectorial capital stock in each
country is calculated as the sum of capital accumulation for 20 years using a depreciation rate of
5%. Wages are estimated as total wage bill divided by the number of workers, and rental rate is
estimated as value-added minus wage bill divided by capital stock. The results are detailed in the
following table, which also reports the R2 of each regression as well as the number of countries. For
industries that comprise more than one 3-digit industry I use a simple average of the elasticities of
substitution. The results are not a®ected by alternative aggregations.
Industry (ISIC Code) r-1 s R-Square n
Food Prod. (311, 312) -1,32 0,76 0,58 32
Beverage (313) -1,16 0,86 0,47 25
Tobacco (314) -0,47 2,12 0,08 20
Textile (321) -1,08 0,93 0,58 29
Apparel (322) -1,42 0,70 0,63 26
Leather (323) -1,16 0,86 0,57 20
Footwear (324) -1,73 0,58 0,84 23
Wood (331) -1,41 0,71 0,74 31
Furniture (332) -1,23 0,81 0,77 23
Paper Prod. (341) -1,24 0,80 0,69 30
Printing and Publishing (342) -1,47 0,68 0,67 28
Chemicals (351) -1,26 0,80 0,67 27
Other Chemicals (352) -1,35 0,74 0,68 23
Petroleum Refineries (353) -0,93 1,08 0,43 18
Misc. Prod. of Petroleum & Coal (354) -1,08 0,92 0,56 13
Rubber (355) -1,52 0,66 0,78 25
Plastic (356) -1,69 0,59 0,81 21
Pottery (361) -1,21 0,83 0,76 14
Glass (362) -1,04 0,96 0,69 19
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Prod. (369) -1,58 0,63 0,78 22
Iron & Steel (371) -1,07 0,94 0,32 27
Non-Ferrous Metals (372) -1,51 0,66 0,68 19
Fabricated Metal Prod. (381) -1,09 0,91 0,71 31
Machinery except Electrical (382) -1,05 0,96 0,43 23
Electrical Machinery (383) -1,45 0,69 0,71 25
Transport Equipment (384) -1,13 0,88 0,54 25
Professional & Scientific Eq. (385) -0,98 1,02 0,55 21
Other Manufacturing Industries (390) -0,73 1,38 0,39 24
ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL
27APPENDIX 2: TECHNOLOGY DIFFERENCES IN CHINA
1. Initial data requirement.




ij is the amount of input i required to produce one unit of value-added in
¯rm n =(state;collective) in industry j.






j is the return to factor f(labor;capital) in ¯rm m(foreign; state; collective) in
sector j.




j is the cost share of labor in total value-added in industry j, where pm
j is the










































j so it is possible to estimate


























With this information, it is possible to estimate aF
Lj=an
Lj. Additionally, by approximating









j and from here the estimation of rS
j =rF
j follows.
At this stage, it is possibleto estimatethe productivity gains as if technologies were of Leontief





Kj = (1 +±n








2. Correcting for di®erences in w=r ratios.
Next, we compare the wage-rental rate ratio between foreign and native ¯rms in each sector
and calculate the required change in (w=r)f in order to be equal to the ratio in native ¯rms.





(w=r)n = c wj
f ¡ b rj
f =®=¯ ¡1
28It is now possible to estimate the new factor intensity ratios between foreign and native ¯rms.
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Kj ¢ (1 + d aF
Kj). (The elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital is assumed to bethe same across di®erent ¯rms in the same
industry, and its estimation is detailed in appendix 4.)
3. Estimation of TFP gains.
The ¯nal step is to compute the productivity gain in each native ¯rm associated with techno-
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29APPENDIX 3: EXTENSION OF THE MODEL WITH THREE TYPES OF FIRMS





t where n represents native ¯rms (s; c), t =0; 1 represents pre and post uni¯cation
and f stands forforeign ¯rms. Uni¯cation and theelimination of product market distortionsimply





























































A = S; C; F stands for state, collective and foreign ¯rms. The employment change in state and
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311 2 3 4 5 6
Mapping from ARYH Wage Gap Labor Share Var. Cost Ratio Tech. Gap Max. TFP gain
Industry w e/w w q 
wL0 q 
eL1 d d/1+d
Total Manufacturing Total Industry 0,37 41,3% 19,8% 7,98 * 88,9%
Food Food, drinks and tobacco 0,42 33,3% 17,1% 26,83 96,4%
Beverages Food, drinks and tobacco 0,32 23,7% 8,9% 26,83 96,4%
Tobacco Food, drinks and tobacco 0,29 4,9% 5,8% 26,83 96,4%
Textiles Textiles 0,42 46,3% 21,2% 4,12 80,5%
Apparel Textiles 0,54 46,9% 30,2% 4,12 80,5%
Leather Textiles 0,49 45,9% 29,9% 4,12 80,5%
Footwear Textiles 0,45 57,3% 38,4% 4,12 80,5%
Wood Furniture, toys and others 0,39 45,3% 29,2% 7,73 88,5%
Furniture Furniture, toys and others 0,36 49,5% 25,9% 7,73 88,5%
Paper Glass, ceramics and paper 0,34 37,8% 29,2% 5,47 84,5%
Printing and Publishing Total Industry 0,31 57,1% 26,1% 7,98 88,9%
Chemicals Chemicals 0,27 33,1% 11,1% 9,34 90,3%
Other Chemicals  Chemicals 0,32 35,5% 11,4% 9,34 90,3%
Petroleum Refineries Total Industry - 6,0% - 7,98 88,9%
Misc. Prod. of Petroleum & Coal Total Industry - 6,0% - 7,98 88,9%
Rubber Total Industry 0,37 46,4% 10,9% 7,98 88,9%
Plastic Total Industry 0,43 45,0% 12,3% 7,98 88,9%
Pottery Glass, ceramics and paper 0,44 54,3% 16,8% 5,47 84,5%
Glass Glass, ceramics and paper 0,34 42,3% 21,6% 5,47 84,5%
Other Non-metallic Mineral Prod. Glass, ceramics and paper 0,34 36,3% 29,4% 5,47 84,5%
Iron and Steel Metallurgy 0,35 40,2% 10,3% 5,25 84,0%
Non-ferrous metals Metallurgy 0,36 40,5% 13,8% 5,25 84,0%
Fabricated Metal Products Metallurgy 0,38 49,9% 25,4% 5,25 84,0%
Machinery, expect electrical Machinery 0,33 47,3% 22,7% 1,85 64,9%
Machinery, electrical Machinery 0,35 44,5% 27,8% 1,85 64,9%
Transport Eq. Transport Eq. 0,31 49,7% 30,4% 7,10 87,7%
Prof. & Scientific Eq. Electronics 0,38 53,1% 30,1% 7,61 88,4%
Other Manufacturing Furniture, toys and others 0,43 43,0% 21,8% 7,73 88,5%
Notes
* Estimated as weighted average of all industries using employment shares 
(1) Mapping of industries from Akerlof et.al (1991)
(2) Ratio of Annual Wages and Salaries per employee - UNIDO Statistical Database
(3) Labor share in value-added in western Germany pre unification - UNIDO Statistical Database
(4) Labor share in value-added of eastern firms after unification, correcting for observed wage and price changes
(5) Implicit technological Difference between eastern and western firms - see text
(6) Multifactor productivity gain for eastern firms associated with fulll convergence
Table 1Industry s l q L l L * s / q K wages per L* l q L l L * s / q K wages per L
Total Manufacturing
Food 0,76            7,3% 17,1% 0,020          8467 5,1% 33,3% 0,041          19969
Beverages 0,86            1,6% 8,9% 0,005          8467 1,2% 23,7% 0,010          26089
Tobacco 2,12            0,5% 5,8% 0,003          8467 0,2% 4,9% 0,004          29541
Textiles 0,93            7,3% 21,2% 0,026          8239 3,4% 46,3% 0,041          19501
Apparel 0,70            3,0% 30,2% 0,009          8226 2,1% 46,9% 0,020          15333
Leather 0,86            1,4% 29,9% 0,005          8225 0,3% 45,9% 0,003          16926
Footwear 0,58            1,0% 38,4% 0,003          8226 0,5% 57,3% 0,005          18107
Wood 0,71            1,6% 29,2% 0,005          8226 1,5% 45,3% 0,013          20875
Furniture 0,81            2,5% 25,9% 0,008          8226 2,0% 49,5% 0,022          22576
Paper 0,80            3,2% 29,2% 0,011          8226 2,3% 37,8% 0,020          23969
Printing and Publishing 0,68            0,9% 26,1% 0,003          8226 2,5% 57,1% 0,028          26127
Chemicals 0,80            3,3% 11,1% 0,009          9420 4,4% 33,1% 0,037          34379
Other Chemicals  0,74            2,4% 11,4% 0,006          9419 4,0% 35,5% 0,033          29406
Petroleum Refineries 1,08            3,1% 16,5% 0,012          9420 0,2% 6,0% 0,001          38641
Misc. Prod. of Petroleum & Coal 0,92            0,4% 16,3% 0,001          9419 0,2% 6,0% 0,001          38641
Rubber 0,66            1,0% 10,9% 0,002          9420 1,4% 46,4% 0,012          25345
Plastic 0,59            0,9% 12,3% 0,002          9420 3,8% 45,0% 0,029          22069
Pottery 0,83            0,4% 16,8% 0,001          8224 0,5% 54,3% 0,007          18818
Glass 0,96            1,4% 21,6% 0,005          8226 1,0% 42,3% 0,011          24290
Other Non-metallic Mineral Prod. 0,63            3,1% 29,4% 0,008          8568 2,0% 36,3% 0,014          25261
Iron and Steel 0,94            3,1% 10,3% 0,010          9372 3,8% 40,2% 0,042          26529
Non-ferrous metals 0,66            0,9% 13,8% 0,002          9372 1,5% 40,5% 0,012          25812
Fabricated Metal Products 0,91            6,0% 25,4% 0,022          9017 9,1% 49,9% 0,116          23689
Machinery, expect electrical 0,96            19,2% 22,7% 0,071          9017 16,2% 47,3% 0,207          27311
Machinery, electrical 0,69            12,4% 27,8% 0,035          8889 14,6% 44,5% 0,128          25684
Transport Eq. 0,88            7,7% 30,4% 0,029          9017 13,4% 49,7% 0,165          28992
Prof. & Scientific Eq. 1,02            3,4% 30,1% 0,015          8890 2,1% 53,1% 0,032          23591
Other Manufacturing 1,38            1,3% 21,8% 0,007          8226 0,7% 43,0% 0,013          19240
l e 29,8%
l w 70,2%




Source: UNIDO Statistical Database and Sinn (2000)
* US in dollars
East Germany West Germany
Table 2State-owned Enterprises  Collective Enterprises
Industry (ISIC Code) TFP 1 TFP 2 TFP 3 TFP 1 TFP 2
Food (311) 67,2% 69,1% 98,1% 41,8% 41,8%
Beverage (313) 61,6% 61,9% 90,9% 60,9% 62,6%
Tobacco (314) -29,9% -1,4% 27,6% -11,2% -6,8%
Textiles (321) 61,6% 67,4% 96,4% -4,2% -0,9%
Apparel & Footwear (322, 324) 78,4% 87,6% 116,6% 60,5% 63,0%
Leather (323) 84,2% 95,8% 124,8% 68,6% 71,6%
Wood (331) 79,3% 91,2% 120,2% 0,4% 3,7%
Furniture (332) 79,4% 99,2% 128,2% 3,2% 6,5%
Paper (341) 45,4% 45,5% 74,5% -13,5% -8,1%
Printing (342) 54,6% 55,7% 84,7% -10,8% -9,1%
Chemicals (351, 352) 45,8% 46,7% 75,7% 8,0% 8,0%
Petroleum (353, 354) -47,2% -12,1% 16,9% -137,0% -70,9%
Rubber (355) 42,3% 42,3% 71,3% 21,2% 21,7%
Plastic (356) 64,9% 73,4% 102,4% 27,0% 27,1%
Pottery and Glass (361, 362, 369) 49,7% 50,3% 79,3% -99,4% -65,1%
Iron & Steel (371) -4,4% 17,9% 46,9% -74,1% -33,3%
Non-ferrous Metals (372) 56,8% 57,3% 86,3% -19,3% -15,3%
Fabricated Metal Products (381) 68,6% 70,7% 99,7% -4,8% 2,7%
Machinery, except electrical (382) 42,8% 43,6% 72,6% -65,6% -27,2%
Machinery, electrical (383) 79,3% 80,7% 109,7% 71,7% 73,1%
Transport (384) 69,1% 73,6% 102,6% 47,9% 48,1%
Prof. & Sc. Equipment (385) 86,0% 98,0% 127,0% 73,6% 76,2%
Other  (390) 74,3% 87,5% 116,5% 41,9% 42,2%
Note:
Source: Author's calculation
TFP 1: Not correcting for differences in w/r
TFP 2: Correcting for differences in w/r
TFP 3: Considering a pre-liberalization subsidy for SOEs of 2.6% of GDP
Table 3State-owned Enterprises Collectivelly-owned Enterprises Foreign-owned Enterprises
Industry (ISIC Code) s t 0 t 1 L q L l L * s / q K wages per L* L q L l L * s / q K wages per L L q L l L * s / q K wages per L
Food (311) 0,76 34% 20% 232 28% 0,025 568 226 14% 0,020 1019 44 8% 0,004 883
Beverage (313) 0,86 59% 15% 80 16% 0,008 581 104 24% 0,012 955 20 8% 0,002 904
Tobacco (314) 2,12 64% 36% 28 4% 0,006 1397 5 0% 0,001 6249 1 20% 0,000 2173
Textiles (321) 0,93 27% 11% 436 59% 0,102 560 579 21% 0,070 761 112 25% 0,014 871
Apparel & Footwear (322, 324) 0,70 32% 16% 34 57% 0,006 600 348 36% 0,039 588 68 16% 0,006 932
Leather (323) 0,86 14% 12% 20 44% 0,003 568 185 33% 0,024 594 36 12% 0,004 883
Wood (331) 0,58 14% 6% 33 69% 0,006 549 100 11% 0,007 364 19 26% 0,002 853
Furniture (332) 0,71 23% 6% 9 83% 0,004 650 63 19% 0,006 449 12 30% 0,001 1011
Paper (341) 0,81 14% 5% 86 35% 0,011 586 154 22% 0,016 794 30 27% 0,003 911
Printing (342) 0,80 9% 5% 54 48% 0,009 771 87 17% 0,009 689 17 29% 0,002 1198
Chemicals (351, 352) 0,68 13% 7% 364 28% 0,035 733 439 21% 0,039 1204 85 15% 0,007 1140
Petroleum (353, 354) 0,80 9% 8% 58 12% 0,005 1275 29 9% 0,003 2434 6 54% 0,001 1983
Rubber (355) 0,74 19% 10% 31 26% 0,003 689 98 28% 0,010 731 19 26% 0,002 1072
Plastic (356) 1,08 17% 8% 31 51% 0,007 625 196 22% 0,028 590 38 18% 0,005 972
Pottery and Glass (361, 362, 369) 0,92 21% 16% 406 65% 0,111 605 573 22% 0,069 875 111 41% 0,018 940
Iron & Steel (371) 0,66 11% 6% 234 27% 0,022 1072 197 33% 0,020 1770 38 72% 0,009 1667
Non-ferrous Metals (372) 0,59 8% 5% 89 42% 0,009 939 56 15% 0,004 1828 11 23% 0,001 1459
Fabricated Metal Products (381) 0,83 15% 10% 72 63% 0,016 702 311 18% 0,032 566 60 33% 0,008 1092
Machinery, except electrical (382) 0,96 15% 6% 447 51% 0,089 695 596 23% 0,077 972 116 50% 0,023 1081
Machinery, electrical (383) 0,63 15% 7% 173 30% 0,016 773 478 28% 0,043 944 93 10% 0,007 1202
Transport (384) 0,94 21% 10% 272 45% 0,047 914 247 23% 0,031 1415 48 17% 0,006 1421
Prof. & Sc. Equipment (385) 0,66 16% 11% 45 58% 0,007 705 76 38% 0,008 919 15 16% 0,001 1097




S l L * s / q K 0,557 0,606 0,131
Note:
Source: China's Statistical Yearbook 1997 and 1999 issues, and author's calculations
* in US dollars
Table 4